We analyze empirically a possible channel for the existence of asymmetric price-cost pass-through, that is, of prices responding di erently to negative and positive upstream cost shocks. While asymmetric price-cost pass-through has been documented in many markets, possible causes for such a phenomenon have not empirically investigated. Using consumer panel data in the co ee retail sector in France, we estimate a demand model structurally allowing for asymmetric consumer responses to positive and negative retail price changes. According to the demand estimates, we indeed nd signicant evidence that consumers react di erentially to positive and negative price movements, in that demand is less sensitive (elastic) to price increases than to price decreases. Then using counterfactual simulations within an equilibrium model of demand and supply side behavior we empirically investigate to what extent the existence of the estimated demand asymmetries contributes to asymmetric responses of equilibrium prices of imperfectly competing rms given upstream negative and positive cost shocks. We do so by simulating positive and negative costs shocks, given the estimated demand model with asymmetric demand responses. We compare the changes in prices to changes in prices resulting from the same magnitude of cost shocks in an alternative demand structure without demand asymmetries. Our ndings suggest that not allowing for asymmetries in demand imply similar magnitudes of simulated price-cost pass-through rates. However, when allowing there to be demand asymmetries, a positive cost shock is passed through to a larger degree to retail prices than a negative cost shock of the same magnitude. Our ndings imply that the shape of the demand explains observed asymmetric price transmission of cost shocks in the context of imperfectly competitive markets.
Introduction
Although according to standard economic price theory, there is no foundation for prices to adjust asymmetrically to cost upturns relative to downturns, empirical ndings suggest there to be in fact such asymmetric price responses in a variety of markets (for a survey see Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2005) . For example, Borenstein et al. (1997) in the U.S., and Noel (2009) for the Canadian market, found that gasoline prices tend to respond faster to crude oil increases than to decreases. In a cross market study for 77 consumer goods and 165 producer goods Peltzman (2000) nds there to be asymmetric price adjustment more generally than one would think : on average, the short term response to a positive cost shock is at least twice the magnitude of the response to a negative shock ; and that symmetry in price adjustments is rather an exception among the goods considered.
The occurrence of asymmetric price transmission has important welfare and, hence, policy implications. If for example, rms do not pass on the price reductions, consumers may not benet as much expected from policy reforms involving say a tax reduction. Beyond documenting the occurrence, understanding the causes behind such a phenomenon is also an important step for policy. Although there are many potential causes advanced to explain the phenomenon of asymmetric and imperfect pass-through (such as menu costs, market power, inventory, as in Peltzman, 2000) to date there is a lack of empirical work establishing causal relationships between possible factors leading to asymmetric price transmission. In an attempt to investigate heterogeneity in the degree of asymmetric price transmissions across markets, Peltzman (2000) investigates in a reduced form setting possible correlates with asymmetric price transmission. He nds signicant heterogeneity in the degree of asymmetry, moreover, the degree of asymmetry is negatively correlated with input price volatility, and his results nd no signicant correlation between the asymmetries and proxies measuring inventory costs, the existence of menu costs, and market power in these markets. In the policy debate asymmetric price transmission is very often considered a result of the abuse of market power (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2005) . 1 In oil markets, for instance, the recent policy debate centers on whether a reduction in gasoline taxes would result in gasoline price reductions at the pump.
The concern there would be that the rms involved in rening and distributing gasoline would strategically adjust their margins resulting in a less than complete pass-through of the tax reduction into nal gasoline prices (The New York Times,
April 2008).
Since the empirical method used to detect this asymmetric price transmission in Peltzman (2000) , and in similar past related studies (e.g. to be added), is reduced form, it does not allow us to investigate formally the possible causes of asymmetric price transmission. Given available observational non experimental data, indeed reduced form approaches may nd, at most, correlated factors and not causal factors. The contribution of the present paper is to propose a formal framework and estimate a structural model that allows us to investigate, via counterfactual simulations, possible causes of asymmetric price transmission in the markets. In particular,
we highlight the possible role of asymmetries in demand as causes of asymmetric rm price transmission of upstream cost shocks into retail prices consumers observe.
The intuition is that, if rms face demand asymmetries, in terms of a much larger response to a price increase than to a price reduction of similar magnitude, they be more reluctant to pass through price increases in the same rate as price savings into nal retail prices.
Our work builds on the e orts by previous papers that nd and document the existence of demand asymmetries. Müller and Ray (2007) show that asymmetric price adjustment exists in a retail grocery chain of Chicago. Krishnamurthi, Mazumdar and Raj (1992) suggest that consumers would react more to perceived prices losses than to price gains in their quantity choice and that only loyal consumers responds di erently to gains and losses in brand choice decisions. Kalyanaram and Little (1994) identify a region of indi erence such that changes in price within this region produce no changes in perception (price thresholds) due to historical benchmark price (consumers remember the price encountered on past purchase occasions) or competitive benchmark price (a benchmark price is formed during the purchase occasion on the basis of the price observed, i.e. shelf prices of competing products).
Han, Gupta, Lehmann (2001) nd asymmetric thresholds and particularly larger thresholds for price decrease versus price increase in the co ee category. Pauwels, Srinivasan and Franses (2007) nd evidence for asymmetric thresholds and for different sign and magnitude of elasticity transitions in a large supermarket of Chicago.
Price thresholds can be justied by adaptation level theory, saturation e ects and brand loyalty. In the case of a negative price gap, that is equivalent to a consumer gain, even though consumers perceive and recognize discounts, they may not react strongly if they are waiting for still better deals (Kalyanaram and Little, 1994 ;  adaptation level theory). Moreover, saturation e ects for gains (Gupta and Cooper, 1992) in retail market may originate from consumer limits to purchasing, transporting, and stockpiling products. For a positive price gap, that is equivalent to a consumer loss, the loss must exceed a consumer's price threshold in order to be perceived (Kalyanaram and Little, 1994 ; adaptation level theory). The loyal consumer may not react if the need or desire for his preferred good is strong enough (Jacoby and Chestnut, 1978 ; brand loyalty).
The approach followed in this paper consists of two steps, where in the rst we estimate a demand model allowing for the possibility of asymmetric demand price sensitivities along the above mentioned literature. In doing so, using consumers' actual purchase data and price variation, we assess the asymmetric price response of consumers in their brand choice in the French Co ee Market. Given the estimated demand model, we investigate in a counterfactual framework, whether the estimated asymmetric price demand model would result in rm level simulated asymmetric cost pass-through, and estimate the magnitude of the asymmetry in price cost trans-mission as a function of demand behavioral factors.
Furthermore, the structural econometric models used allow us to account for the structure of this industry, and in particular the horizontal and vertical interactions between manufacturers and retailers. From estimates of consumers' demand on the French Co ee Market, we are able to recover price cost margins and estimated marginal costs from a supply model as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010) . While assumptions on relationships between manufacturers and retailers and on vertical restraints may change the magnitude of the retail price transmission as show, we are not focused here on the level of pass-through per see, namely, we are interested in the identication of asymmetries in cost pass through. Thanks to simulations of cost shocks, we estimate cost pass-through and by implementing positive and negative cost shock simulations, we will test the asymmetry of cost pass-through.
Section 2 describes the French Co ee market and available data. Section 3 presents the estimation method allowing to estimate asymmetric price response of consumers and asymmetric price threshold in their brand choice behavior. Section 4 develops the method used to estimate cost pass-through by recovering price-cost margins, estimating marginal costs and simulating cost shock. Section 5 describes demand results, asymmetric consumer behavior and asymmetric pass-through, while section 6 concludes.
French Co ee Market and Data
We focus our empirical analysis on the French Co ee Market during the period 1998-2006, a market that is third in the world. In 2006, behind USA and Germany, the French per capita average consumption amounts to 5 kilograms per year and then consumption stagnates in the last decade. During this long period of analysis we take advantage of price variations on raw co ee price and product prices. As Figure   1 shows, in the raw co ee price (composite indicator price of the International Co ee , that represents the evolution of raw co ee price and brand prices in a retailer, shows an asymmetric product price adjustment when raw co ee price decreases or increases and also shows that price variations of co ee products on the French market are product specic. Raw co ee price increases seem to be more transmitted than raw co ee price decreases. Table 1 presents a reduced form analysis of retail price on raw co ee price where we see the impact on retail price being larger when we observe an increased raw price than a decreased one. Indeed, Raw + represents the raw co ee price interacted with a dummy which is equal to one if the raw co ee price at the period t is larger than the raw co ee price at period t-1. Raw is the raw co ee price in the case of negative change. The coe cient related to Raw + is indeed larger meaning that raw co ee prices impact more retail prices when they increase rather than they decrease. From the reduced form estimates we conclude that the French Co ee market consists
of an interesting market to analyze the possible forces behind asymmetric price transmission of a cost shock into retail prices. The French co ee market is concentrated at both the manufacturer and the retailer levels. The retailing industry of the French Co ee market represents 90% of the total consumption of co ee and is composed of seven main retailers (70% of the co ee purchases in the data) and four main manufacturers which produce six national brands (71% of the co ee purchases in the seven main retailers in our data). Market shares of the six brands vary from 2.5% to 10%. We take into account private labels of retailers on this market which represent 14% of the market share of our sample. On average, the 49 products considered, which are dened as a brand in a retailer, represent 52% of the total purchases each period, where a period consists of 4 weeks.
The data used in this paper are collected by TNS WordPanel and market shares, prices, and promotion rates for all products at each period are computed from household co ee purchases from 1998 to 2006. We also are able to compute from the consumer purchases the characteristics of the product such as the rate of Arabica co ee and ground co ee. In our data, during the period 1998-2006, we have roughly 50% of price increases. This proportion is the same for all brands and all retailers considered in this paper, except for brand 4 where the proportion of price increases is lightly greater (55%). Descriptive statistics of these data are presented in Table 2 and 3. There is some heterogeneity in patterns of average price and market shares among brands. Prices are between 5.02 and 9.60 and market shares between 2.69% and 14.30%. Brand 1 is the most expensive, which could be explained by the weakest promotion rate (9.77%) and the higher rate of Arabica co ee. Brand 5 is the cheapest and has the highest promotion rate (38.69%). The private label product is sold at 5.49 on average and has the higher market shares. Interestingly there is no heterogeneity in price across retailers despite a large heterogeneity in market shares among them. For Arabica, bean and ca eine-free co ee types we note that there is little heterogeneity among purchases in the di erent retailers. In terms of product purchases, 60% originate from Arabica co ee for all retailers, 1.7% are bean co ee product at period can be written as :
where is a product xed e ect capturing time invariant product characteristics, is a time xed e ect allowing to capture seasonal variations and trend of co ee consumption, is the price of the product j at period t and represents the consumer marginal utility for price or price sensitivity, are observed product characteristics and are the corresponding marginal utility coe cients. The term accounts for monthly changes in factors such as shelf space, positioning of the product among others that a ect consumer utility, that are observed by consumers and rms but are not observed by the researcher. Finally is an i.i.d. type I extreme value distributed error term capturing consumer idiosyncratic preferences.
We allow for unobserved household heterogeneity in the price sensitivity through a random component (0 1) in and for an asymmetric consumer price response through both coe cient 1 and 2 . The coe cient of price variable is then given by
We suppose that the reference price of consumers is only the last price observed.
This adjustment implies that consumers make an immediate and complete adjustment in their price expectations after an exposure to a price stimulus.
We introduce an outside good option, denoted good 0, to allow the possibility of consumer not buying one of the marketed products and suppose that the utility is given by :
Let the distribution of across consumers be denoted by ( ). The aggregate share of product at period across all consumers is obtained by integrating the consumer level probabilities :
This demand model implies own-and cross-price elasticities and we will investigate empirically if there exists an asymmetric behavior in the observed price responses of consumers.
Estimation and identication of Demand
To estimate the set of parameters = ( 
Counterfactual simulation Method of Cost PassThrough
In this section, after deducing the price elasticities given demand and resulting price cost margins given the supply model, we then compute estimated marginal cost by subtracting estimated margins from observed prices. Thanks to simulations comparing equilibrium prices in both cases, with and without a cost shock on the estimated marginal costs, we are able to estimate cost pass-through. We will then estimate the cost-price pass-through in both cases of positive and negative upstream cost shocks and we will examine whether we obtain simulated signicantly di erent magnitudes in price changes. Finally, we perform these simulations given the estimated demand model allowing for demand asymmetric price responses, and confront the price-cost pass through patterns for negative and positive cost shocks shutting down demand asymmetries using a counterfactual demand model.
Supply Model
Given the market considered, we assume an oligopoly model of two part tari contracts between manufacturers and retailers to estimate price-cost margins and marginal costs. This model introduced theoretically by Rey and Vergé (2010) and empirically implemented in Bonnet and Dubois (2010) allows us to derive price-cost margins in the case where we assume resale price maintenance with respect to linear pricing contracts, that are usually used. Moreover, these two part tari s contracts with resale price maintenance are considered in several empirical studies of vertical contracts as a better model than the linear pricing one or two part tari contracts without resale price maintenance Dubois, 2008 and Bonnet and Requillart, 2013) .
Manufacturers o er two-part tari s contracts which consists of wholesale prices and franchise fees paid by the retailer for selling the product j to the manufacturer but also retail prices since manufacturers can use resale price maintenance.
Then retailers simultaneously accept or reject the o ers that are public information.
If one o er is rejected, all contracts are refused. If all o ers have been accepted, retailers simultaneously set their retail prices and demand and contracts are satised.
Let dene the set of products sold by the retailer r and the set of products produced by the manufacturer f.
In the case of these two part tari s contracts, the prot function of retailer is
where the constant marginal cost of distribution of product j and ( ) the market share of the product j. The prot function of rm is equal to
where represents the constant marginal cost of production of product . Manufacturer chooses the terms of the contracts ( and ) in order to maximize prots subject to the following retailers' participation constraints for all
= 1
If we consider the case where wholesale prices are such that the retailers add only retail costs to the wholesale prices and thus the retailer's price cost margins are zero ( ( ) = 0), we deduce from this model, an expression for the price-cost margins of the manufacturer f :
where products in { 0 } are private labels. Given the vertical supply model assumptions a price cost margin is obtained = for the product and a corresponding marginal cost = + = follows.
Cost Shock Simulation
Given these marginal costs = ( 1 ) and the other estimated structural parameters, we are able to simulate an upstream cost shock and equilibrium prices are deduced from the following minimization program
where k k is a norm of R . In practice we will take the Euclidean norm in R
The cost pass-through is estimated from the di erence between observed prices and new equilibrium prices in the case of a cost shock. We investigate the asymmetry of cost pass-through simulating both a cost increase (for instance, = 1 1) and a cost decrease of the same magnitude (for instance, = 0 9) and comparing the magnitude of the price-cost pass-through for both the negative and the positive cost shock, where price-cost pass-through is dened as the ratio between the price change and the cost change. 3 The same counterfactual comparative statics simulations are performed for the estimated demand model allowing for demand asymmetries and then also for an alternative counterfactual demand model without asymmetries. We turn to the demand, costs, and nally to simulated results next.
Demand Asymmetry Results and Cost PassThrough Simulations
In this section, we rst present results from the estimation of consumers demand to assess asymmetric consumer price response to an increase or decrease in retail prices. Then, we show how cost pass-through could di er in magnitude according to the sign of the change in cost via counterfactual simulations allowing for demand asymmetries, and then repeating those simulations for a counterfactual demand scenario without asymmetries. are faced with a price increase, their price marginal utility signicantly decreases by 0 12. There continues to be signicant heterogeneity in marginal utility of price, as the point estimate is 0 18 and signicant. While promotional rates had a negative marginal utility in Model 1, when we do account for asymmetric consumer price responses then the promotional rate's marginal utility becomes positive and non-signicant. Consumers continue to prefer Arabica to other characteristics as the coe cient related to the Arabica co ee rate is positive and signicant.
Demand -Investigating Asymmetries in Consumer Price Responses
In general, the random coe cients logit model allows for exible price elasticities along the demand curve, which is an attractive feature relative to other demand specications -such as constant elasticity. For instance, for Model 1, which is a standard random coe cients demand model, we obtain signicantly di erent own price elasticities when prices increase and when prices decrease. The rst column of Table 5 reports elasticities for model 1 and price increases and the second column for model 1 and price decreases. Then column 3 and 4 repeats the same structure of elasticity estimates for model 2. Finally, the elasticities are broken down by brands in each row of Table 5 where the rst row of the table reports average own price elasticities across all brands. We obtain -4.58 (1.01) and -3.65 (0.65) for own price elasticities when prices increase in models 1 and 2 respectively, and -4.36 (1.00) and for models 1 and 2 respectively, when prices decrease. While estimated own price elasticities seem to be fairly similar when consumers face a price decrease, we obtain a signicant di erence in estimated implied elasticities when prices increase when comparing model 1 to model 2. In particular, if we do not account for asymmetric price responses, as in model 1, we over estimate consumer price response by 30% in average when they face a price increase. Breaking up the comparison by brand, looking down on Table 5 , we also see that own price elasticities are di erent across brands and that the over estimation of own price elasticities could vary from 27% to 35%, according the brand in question, if we do not consider demand asymmetries.
In sum, the estimates suggest there to be signicant price sensitivity heterogeneity in the data as well as asymmetries in the way consumers respond to price changes depending on them being price drops or price increases. Moreover, not accounting for those asymmetries would imply that we overestimate demand elasticities in the case of price increases. What these demand empirical ndings imply for the recovered marginal cost estimates and for the ability of rms to pass through positive and negative costs shocks into retail prices will be investigated next.
Cost Pass-Through Counterfactual Simulations
From the demand model estimates, we are able to compute estimated margins from the supply model in section 4.1. We obtain in average 35.08% with a standard Given the estimated models, we simulate a range of negative and positive shocks (between -100% and 100%) to obtain a distribution of cost pass-through estimates.
The rst step is to estimate the impact of the cost shock on the total marginal cost of co ee products. We use an OLS regression of the marginal cost estimated from the demand and supply models on the raw co ee price and product and time xed e ects and the results are given in Table 6 . Marginal cost changes correspond to 84% of the simulated raw cost shock, that is when the raw co ee shock increases by 10%, the impact of the total marginal cost is by 8.4%, and that is true for the marginal cost estimated from both demand models.
Recall that the estimated price-cost pass-through is dened by the ratio of the di erence in nal retail price and the di erence in raw co ee cost shock. Given estimates of demand allowing for demand asymmetries, as given by model 2, Figure   B depicts estimated average price-cost pass-through and 95% condence intervals in the vertical axis. In the horizontal axis we report di erent levels of simulated shocks, from 100% to 100%. Similarly, in Figure A we report the simulated average pricecost pass-through and 95% condence intervals in the y-axis, for the di erent levels of simulated shocks in the horizontal axis, for a counterfactual demand model of no demand asymmetries (where
Figure B suggests that a positive raw co ee shock is more passed onto retail prices than a negative raw co ee shock when considering asymmetric price response.
We also obtain that the pass-through tends to decrease after a positive cost shock greater than 50%. Small negative cost shocks are slightly transmitted more than 1 whereas after a negative 10% cost shock, the pass-through seems to converge to one. Price-cost pass-through Price-cost pass-through without asymmetric consumer price response with asymmetric consumer price response When asymmetric consumer price response is not considered, turning now to Figure A , we can see that few di erences exist between the e ect of a positive and of a negative cost shock on retail prices. Both imply a pass-through around 1, even if a positive cost shock slightly implies a pass-through above one and a negative cost shock below one. Table 7 shows the results from a second stage regression of estimated passthrough rates on cost shock variables and on product characteristics when we take into account the asymmetric price response of consumers in the demand model. We project the estimated pass-through rates into average pass-through for each retailer (given by dummy variable point estimates for each retailer separately relative to retailer 7, that is omitted). The estimated dummies capture the di erent average price transmission rates of retailers. We do the same by projecting estimated passthrough on a dummy for each of the three manufacturers and for the private labels.
Finally we also project estimated pass through on negative cost shocks and positive Tab. 7 -Regression of Pass-through on cost shock variables and product characteristics.
With asymmetric consumer price response cost shocks, where we include as explanatory variables the value of the cost shock, di erentiating between negative and positive shocks, and allowing for di erent e ects whether the cost shock is greater than 50%. Finally, we control for the time period as well in the regression specication.
We nd very small di erences across retailers. While very few of the retailer xed e ects are signicant, their value is economically low. Concerning manufacturers specic pass-through given by the manufacturer estimated xed e ects, we see larger and more signicant manufacturer di erences. This implies that the role of manufacturers in the price transmission of cost shock is greater than the role of retailers. While this result could be seen as a consequence of the supply model assumed, we argue next that is not the case. Indeed, we consider that manufacturers have all bargaining power and they impose to retailers the consumer prices. However, Rey and Vergé (2010) show the price equilibrium would be the same whether one assumed that retailers have all the bargaining power. Only the sharing of the prot would change. The estimated marginal cost and then the estimated pass-through rates would be the same. Hence, this result is not an artifact of this assumption.
In sum, there is heterogeneity across manufacturers in the price transmission of a cost shock. We also see that private labels transmit more negative shocks than the three other manufacturers whereas their price transmission of a positive cost shock is signicantly lower than manufacturers 1 and 2. Results from cost shock variables show that the pass-through from a positive cost shock increases with the level of the shock whereas we nd the opposite result for negative cost shocks. We also nd that large positive cost shocks (greater than 50%) are less transmitted and large negative cost shocks are more transmitted. Taken as a whole, we see that cost shocks are more transmitted to the consumer price than the variation in cost and positive cost shocks are more transmitted than negative ones as we saw in the graphical analysis and discussion as well.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present empirical evidence on the role of possible asymmetries in consumers' price responses into explaining asymmetric cost price pass-through into retail prices. For that, we use a structural econometric model that allows to recover marginal costs from prices, market shares and product characteristics. Given the demand and supply model we estimate marginal cost. From estimated cost we simulate shocks and nd the resulting simulated new equilibrium prices.
Introducing the possibility of consumers reacting di erently to a price increase or decrease, we nd that French households are less sensitive to a price increase than to a price decrease on the Co ee Market. Our ndings suggest that one would overstate elasticities for price increases by about 30% if not considering demand asymmetries. Ultimately these ndings imply di erent magnitudes of a cost passthrough into retail prices, depending on the sign of the cost shock. In particular, we nd that allowing there to be demand asymmetries, a positive cost shock is passed through to a larger degree into retail prices than a negative cost shock of the same magnitude.
Our ndings imply that the shape of the demand explains observed asymmetric price transmission of cost shocks in the context of imperfectly competitive markets.
Future work could consider varying the competitive structure of the empirical setting by looking into other market settings. Another possible avenue of research is to consider dynamics into the analysis, both on the demand, and on the supply side, while incorporating formally menu costs of changing prices into the model. As these models become quite complicated to solve analytically and computationally intensive we see this research extension e orts as potential next steps into understanding the magnitude and the asymmetry of price-cost pass-through in the markets.
